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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Jessica Starr appeals from the district court’s decision affirming the 
judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding Starr guilty of misdemeanor 
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia.  Starr contends the district court 
erred in affirming the magistrate’s suppression and evidentiary rulings. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
Starr was issued a citation for misdemeanor possession of marijuana.  
(R., p.12.)  Although Starr initially entered a written guilty plea, she later filed a 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea, and the court granted that motion.  (R., pp.14, 
28-29, 31.)  Starr then filed a motion to suppress “all evidence,” claiming the 
evidence was “obtained as a result of an illegal search.”  (R., pp.34, 37.)  At the 
suppression hearing, Officer Dennis Hammer testified that he was dispatched to 
investigate a reckless driving call, which ultimately led him to Starr’s apartment.  
(Tr., p.6, L.8 – p.7, L.19.)  Before Officer Hammer “had even knocked on the 
door,” he could “smell[ ] the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the 
doorway.”  (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-23.)    
When Officer Hammer knocked on the door of Starr’s apartment, he 
asked to speak to the reported reckless driver, Kenneth Young.  (Tr., p.7, Ls.7-
18.)  Starr “walked back inside the residence and got Mr. Young.”  (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.18-19.)  “As the door opened,” Officer Hammer “could smell [marijuana] even 
more.”  (Tr., p.7, L.25.)   
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When Starr and Young returned to the door, Officer Hammer asked if he 
could come inside; Starr said, “No.”  (Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23.)  Officer Hammer then 
explained to Young why he was there and also told Starr and Young that he 
could smell marijuana coming from the apartment.  (Tr., p.12, L.11 – p.14, L.15.)  
Officer Hammer asked, “So is there any way we can go inside and get that and 
just deal with that issue?”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.15-17.)  Starr answered, “Can I just bring 
you what I have out here?,” and Officer Hammer responded, “Well, can I just 
step inside with you?”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.)  Starr said she would “rather just 
bring it out,” and when Officer Hammer asked why, Starr answered, “I’ll give you 
everything I have.”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.22-25.)  Officer Hammer and Starr then 
engaged in the following exchange: 
OFFICER HAMMER:  I can hang outside your doorway, if you like.  
I mean, I’m not looking to go through all your stuff or anything. 
 
[STARR]:  I’ll bring you everything I have out here. 
 
OFFICER HAMMER:  Okay.  Which is what, though? 
 
[STARR]:  I have a pipe, and I have, like two or three bowls 
(inaudible). 
 
. . . 
 
OFFICER HAMMER:  Okay.  Any weed left? 
 
[STARR]:  Yes. 
 
OFFICER HAMMER:  Any baggies. 
 
[STARR]:  No. 
 
OFFICER HAMMER:  Stuff in there? 
 
[STARR]:  No.  It’s in a container, and I’ll bring that to you. 
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 (Tr., p.15, L.11 – p.16, L.12.)  
Starr also told Officer Hammer she was “concerned about any drug 
charges that may cause her to be evicted.”  (Tr., p.17, Ls.8-11.)  Officer Hammer 
advised Starr she could “cooperate” or he could “request a warrant for [her] 
arrest” based on the fact that he could smell marijuana and Starr had admitted 
she had marijuana.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-19.)  Young encouraged Starr to cooperate, 
stating, “We’ve go to work with him, he’ll work with us.”  (Tr. p.19, Ls.10-11.)  
Officer Hammer asked again if he could “step in” and Starr “eventually” opened 
the door and allowed Officer Hammer to stand inside the door “while she 
gathered the items.”  (Tr., p.20, L.19, p.21, Ls.3-9, p.22, L.17 – p.23, L.25; see 
also p.24, Ls.3-18.)  Starr then went into her bedroom and, as she came out, she 
closed the door behind her and “immediately apologized” for doing so.  (Tr., p.24, 
L.16 – p.25, L.5.)   
“Several minutes after” Officer Hammered entered Starr’s apartment, the 
assist officer he requested at the beginning of the encounter arrived.  (Tr., p.10, 
L.21 – p.11, L.6, p.28, Ls.10-20.)  After Starr provided Officer Hammer with the 
items from her bedroom, and after Officer Hammer contacted dispatch with the 
names of the individuals who were present, Officer Hammer asked Starr if he 
could check her room “to make sure” she had provided everything.  (Tr., p.25, 
L.14 – p.29, L.16.)  Officer Hammer invited Starr to go with him and assured her 
did not intend to “tear[ ] through [her] stuff or anything.”  (Tr., p.29, Ls.16-18.)  
Starr responded by stepping ahead of Officer Hammer, walking toward her room, 
 4 
and opening the door; Officer Hammer interpreted Starr’s actions as giving him 
permission to go into her room.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.3-18.)   
Inside Starr’s room, Officer Hammer found another pipe.  (Tr., p.30, L.20 
– p.31, L.12.)  At that point, Officer Hammer asked Starr if “there was anything 
else,” and “asked her several times if [he could] search the room to make sure.”  
(Tr., p.31, Ls.14-16.)  Starr “didn’t really answer, but she did tell [Officer 
Hammer] that there was nothing else.”  (Tr., p.31, Ls.16-18.)  However, Starr 
“walked over towards the bed stand area,” and when Officer Hammer asked her 
to open the nightstand, Starr did, and Officer Hammer “noticed a bong inside.”  
(Tr., p.31, Ls.18-20.)  Officer Hammer also asked about other items he 
observed.  (Tr., p.38, L.14 – p.44, L.22, p.51, L.2 – p.52, L.7.)        
The magistrate denied Starr’s request to suppress the drugs and 
paraphernalia Starr removed from her bedroom and brought to the table to give 
to Officer Hammer, but granted her request to suppress any items found after 
that.  (Tr., p.65, Ls.14-16.)  The magistrate found that Starr “allowed” Officer 
Hammer “to step inside the door” and “allowed” him to “go to the table and 
examine the things” she retrieved from her bedroom, but Starr did not “voluntarily 
consent[ ] to any further search” because “she was put under a lot of pressure by 
the circumstances she was in and was just caught up in the . . . wheedling that 
continued” in relation to Officer Hammer’s requests to search Starr’s room.  (Tr., 
p.64, L.4 – p.65, L.5.)  The magistrate also found that Officer Hammer exceeded 
the scope of his “agreement” with Starr, which only allowed him inside the door 
and to take possession of the items Starr brought from her bedroom, but Officer 
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Hammer “violat[ed]” the “agreement” by “ask[ing] for more and more consent to 
search more and more areas.”  (Tr., p.65, Ls.6-13.)   
Starr proceeded to trial.  (See generally Tr., pp.67-196.)  Prior to trial, the 
state also charged Starr with possession of paraphernalia.  (R., p.45.)  At trial, 
the state sought to introduce portions of the audio recording of the interaction 
between Officer Hammer and Starr.  (Tr., p.80, Ls.11-15, p.81, Ls.7-11; see also 
pp.93-96 (modifying exhibit numbers).)  Starr moved to exclude portions of the 
audio, arguing the statements she made to Officer Hammer were involuntary and 
the product of the illegal search.  (Tr., p.97, Ls.1-23.)  The magistrate, noting that 
Starr was essentially making an untimely request for suppression, denied her 
motion after concluding Starr’s statements were not the result of Officer Hammer 
exploiting the search the magistrate found was nonconsensual.  (Tr., p.100, L.19 
– p.103, L.10.)   
Despite her previous objections and requests for suppression, after the 
state rested, Starr indicated she wanted to play the entirety of the audio of the 
interaction between her and Officer Hammer  to “give a full understanding to the 
jury” and to support a defense that her admissions were “unreliable.”  (Tr., p.159, 
L.6 – p.160, L.14.)  The state objected.  (Tr., p.160, L.17 – p.161, L.18.)  The 
magistrate ruled, in relevant part: 
As to the evidence about the entirety of the encounter that 
the officer had with Ms. Starr, I see that the argument could be 
made that her admissions were not reliable evidence because of 
the amount of pressure she was placed under by the officer. 
 
I also see that the State is frustrated by the fact that all this 
effort was put into suppressing this very evidence, and now it all 
seems to be what the defense wants to introduce. 
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The bigger issue is whether it gives the jury the impression 
that somehow it was the State that was trying to limit the 
information that they obtained and that the defense is now 
heroically giving them the whole story, when, in fact, it’s exactly the 
opposite of what occurred. 
 
I think that’s very unfair to the State, that possibility.  I don’t 
know whether the jury would look at it that way or not, but that 
possibility is very unfair to the State. 
 
(Tr., p.162, Ls.1-18.) 
 The magistrate, therefore, denied Starr’s request to introduce the entirety 
of the audio, but allowed her to ask Officer Hammer questions “that relate to the 
issue of how much pressure he put on Ms. Starr prior to making these 
admissions and what the nature of the encounter was between them.”  (Tr., 
p.162, L.22 – p.163, L.12.)    
The jury found Starr guilty of both charges (possession of marijuana and 
paraphernalia), and the court entered a withheld judgment.  (R., pp.120, 125-
126.)  Starr timely appealed to the district court.  (R., pp.129-131.) 
 On intermediate appeal, Starr raised two issues:  (1) “Did the magistrate 
court err in failing to address whether Starr’s admissions were attenuated of [sic] 
the taint of the illegal search?”; and (2) “Did the magistrate court err by depriving 
Starr of the opportunity to present evidence about the circumstances of Starr’s 
admission?”  (R., p.154.)  The district court denied relief on both claims and 
affirmed.  (R., pp.196-204.)  Starr filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  




 Starr states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the District Court err in affirming the Magistrate, when 
the Magistrate did not perform the required analysis of attenuation 
before admitting statements made by Starr as she sat on her bed 
during an unconstitutional search of her room? 
 
2. Did the District Court err in affirming the Magistrate, when 
the Magistrate deprived Starr of the opportunity to present to the 
jury the unplayed portions of Hammer’s audio? 
 
(Brief of Appellant (“Appellant’s Brief”), p.6 (punctuation original).) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Starr failed to show the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate’s conclusion that Starr was not entitled to exclusion of her 
admissions? 
 
2. Has Starr failed to show the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate’s discretionary ruling regarding the admissibility of the entire audio of 
Starr’s encounter with Officer Hammer, which included reference to evidence 




Starr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate’s 
Suppression And Evidentiary Rulings  
 
A. Introduction 
 Starr contends the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s ruling 
denying Starr’s request to suppress her statements admitting to possessing 
marijuana and paraphernalia.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-10.)  Starr also contends 
the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of her request to 
present the entirety of an audio, portions of which referenced evidence Starr 
successfully prevented the state from presenting during its case-in-chief.  
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-13.)  Both of Starr’s arguments fail.  Application of the 
law to the evidence supports the district court’s decision.  Starr was not entitled 
to suppression of her statements, nor was she entitled to introduce suppressed 
evidence.  Even if Starr could establish error, the district court correctly 
concluded any error was harmless.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  The 
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
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“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [this Court] accept[s] the trial 
court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the Court] 
freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  
State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
“[T]he trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial 
and its judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of 
discretion.”  State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-974, 829 P.2d 861, 863-
864 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 
C. Starr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The 
Magistrate’s Denial Of Starr’s Request To Suppress Her Admissions To 
Owning And Possessing The Marijuana And Paraphernalia She Gave To 
Officer Hammer 
 
 “Because the exclusionary rule imposes a price upon society that can 
enable the guilty to escape prosecution, the exclusionary rule is only applicable if 
there is a causal connection between the police misconduct and the acquisition 
of challenged evidence.”  State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 508, 198 P.3d 735, 737 
(Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).  In deciding whether evidence should be 
excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” a court considers three factors:  “(1) 
The temporal proximity of the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) 
whether there are intervening circumstances between the illegality and the 
acquisition of the evidence; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct.”  Id. at 509, 198 P.3d at 738 (citations omitted).  “The last of the 
three factors . . . is particularly important because it comes closest to satisfying 
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the deterrence rationale for application of the exclusionary rule.”  State v. 
Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 910-911, 155 P.3d 704, 711-712 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(quotations and citation omitted, ellipses original).   
During her interaction with Officer Hammer, Starr admitted, more than 
once, that she possessed marijuana and paraphernalia.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-23, 
p.15, Ls.2-20, p.16, Ls.6-12, p.18, Ls.2-12, p.21, Ls.18-20, p.26, Ls.4-7, p.27, 
Ls.9-12.)  Starr did not expressly request exclusion of her statements until trial, 
at which time she objected to the audio clips labelled Exhibits 1C and 1D.  (Tr., 
p.96, L.24 – p.97, L.23.)  Exhibit 1C is the portion of Officer Hammer’s interaction 
with Starr that occurred between 16:00 and 16:45, and Exhibit 1D is the portion 
of the interaction that occurred between 19:21 and 20:00.  Specifically, defense 
counsel argued:   
 Your Honor, in the motion to suppress hearing, the Court 
ruled that, if I can paraphrase my understanding, I guess, is that 
the Court disallowed evidence going forward from the time that, 
besides the items that were brought out by my client early on in 
their interaction.  I believe that’s the audio that we’re playing along 
and plays up till about minute 9:20.[1] 
 
 Over the next five minutes, the officer goes into her room 
and proceeds to go about the thing that we’ve discussed already, 
Your Honor.  At about minute 16, he Mirandizes my client and then 
asks her about the items in question, the items that weren’t 
suppressed.   
 
                                            
1 Exhibit 1A is the portion of the interaction that occurred from the beginning up 
to 9:23, and Exhibit 1B is the portion that occurred between 9:40 and 9:49.  
Exhibit 1A was originally the beginning of the audio to 9:49, but the magistrate 
granted Starr’s request to exclude the portion of the exchange in which Officer 
Hammer asks Starr if she had been in trouble before.  (Tr., p.81, Ls.6-7, p.86, 
L.10 – p.92, L.23.)  As a result, Exhibit 1A became the beginning of the audio to 
9:23, and Exhibit 1B became 9:40 to 9:49.  (Tr., p.93, L.4 – p.96, L.23.)    
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 Your Honor, I would argue that, despite the fact that Miranda 
was given, it wasn’t knowledgeably, voluntarily waived at that point, 
that the officer, that the entire scene from that point was essentially 
a continuing transaction as the officer questioned my client about 
those items.  I think as part of this sanction I’m asking that those 
statements be kept out, Your Honor.  The reason being that I don’t 
see an independent basis that the officer would have had to obtain 
those statements.  The taint would not have attenuated from the 
prior conduct, Your Honor, and so I would ask that both C and D be 
kept from trial. 
 
(Tr., p.97, Ls.1-23.)   
 Addressing Starr’s request for suppression, the magistrate specifically 
referenced Lusby, which sets forth the applicable three-factor test applicable to 
an attenuation analysis, and stated: 
My conclusion is that it would have been appropriate for the 
officer to have arrested, he had promised not to, but if he had 
arrested her, taken her back to the station, Mirandized her, and 
questioned her when she had made admissions, certainly there 
would have been nothing inappropriate about that.  So does it 
somehow matter that it happened in the bedroom and closer in 
time to the search of the bedroom, which I have ruled he did not 
have consent to make?  I think if she was Mirandized and told that 
she didn’t have to say anything, and she chose to make 
statements, that those things were consensual, and that consent is 
not changed by the fact that they were in a place where she did not 
consent to a search. 
 
I don’t think that the illegally obtained evidence, mainly the 
items that were found in the bedroom, were in any way exploited in 
such a way that that exploiting resulted in the obtaining of these 
admissions.  So I’m going to deny the motion to suppress, if that’s 
what it is, those admissions, and will allow those admissions found 
in Exhibits 1C and 1D into evidence. 
 
(Tr., p.102, L.6 – p.103, L.10.)    
 Starr’s complaint on appeal to the district court was that the magistrate 
reached this conclusion without “address[ing] attenuation of the taint of the illegal 
search.”  (R., p.156.)  The district court found that, although the magistrate did 
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not conduct a full attenuation analysis, the magistrate was not required to do so 
because the magistrate “properly concluded that the temporal proximity was not 
satisfied,” and, as a result, “there was no need to address the remaining factors.”  
(R., pp.200-201.)  That the magistrate did not expressly address each factor in 
the attenuation analysis does not, however, mean that the magistrate’s analysis 
was incomplete.  Moreover, application of the three factors to the facts supports 
the magistrate’s decision.  While the challenged admissions were made close in 
time to the search the magistrate found was nonconsensual, suppression is not 
automatically required because a court must still consider any intervening 
circumstances and the “purpose and flagrancy” of the alleged misconduct.  
Lusby, 146 Idaho at 509, 198 P.3d at 738.   
While not dispositive, Miranda warnings, which Starr received prior to the 
challenged admission, are a relevant consideration in the attenuation analysis.  
Cardenas, 143 Idaho at 910, 155 P.3d at 711.  As noted by the district court, 
there was no contention that Starr’s post-Miranda statements were not voluntary 
(R., p.200), and a review of the audio recording reveals that, after receiving 
Miranda warnings, Starr readily agreed to talk to Officer Hammer (Exhibit 1C).  
That she did so voluntarily, and not as a result of any unlawful action by Officer 
Hammer, is consistent with her admissions at the outset of the encounter when 
she first responded to Officer Hammer’s request to come in and “deal” with the 
marijuana he could smell by telling him she would bring Officer Hammer what 
she had, which included a pipe and “two or three bowls of pot.”  (Tr., p.14, L.8 – 
p.15, L.20; Exhibit 1A at 2:00 – 2:50.)         
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Further, although the magistrate found that the search of Starr’s room was 
nonconsensual, Officer Hammer’s conduct was not flagrant, particularly when 
considered in the context of the entire encounter.  Early in the encounter, Starr 
admitted that she had marijuana and paraphernalia inside her apartment and 
agreed to give those items to Officer Hammer.  Starr subsequently gave Officer 
Hammer permission to come inside and wait by the door while she retrieved the 
contraband.  Officer Hammer’s pursuit of information in relation to those items 
and his desire to ensure that all contraband was removed from Starr’s apartment 
was anything but flagrant misconduct.  The district court, therefore, correctly 
decided that the magistrate did not err in its ruling.   
 On appeal to this Court, Starr complains that the district court “improperly 
placed the burden on [her] to persuade the court that ‘the evidence was obtained 
as a result of the illegal activity’ by Officer Hammer.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9 
(quoting R., p.201) (emphasis in quoted material).)  Starr further argues that the 
district court’s “logic” would require Starr “to testify at the motion hearing, and 
persuade the magistrate that the statements were—at least in part—a product of 
the Hammer’s [sic] unconstitutional search.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.)  These 
arguments reflect either a misunderstanding or a misrepresentation of the district 
court’s opinion.   
 The language Starr quotes in support of her argument is taken out of 
context.  What the district court wrote was:  “But as Lusby directs, the issue is 
not one of mere physical proximity, but rather whether the evidence was 
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obtained as a result of the illegal activity.”  (R., p.201 (emphasis original).)  The 
district court then wrote:   
Had Hammer questioned Starr about the items found in the 
bedroom, all of the temporal requirements . . . would be met.  He 
did not.  Rather, he questioned her about the items she had 
produced.  The jury did not hear any statements attributable to the 
suppressed evidence.  This Court disagrees with the Magistrate’s 
analogy about being taken to the police station, but does conclude 
that the Magistrate properly concluded that the temporal proximity 
test was not satisfied.  Therefore, there was no need to address the 
remaining factors. 
  
(R., p.201.)   
 No reasonable reading of the language Starr quotes, or the district court’s 
analysis, supports Starr’s assertion that the district court “improperly placed the 
burden” on her, or Starr’s belief that the district court’s “logic” would compel her 
testimony at any point in the proceedings.  The burden Starr does have is to 
show error on appeal, and she failed to meet that burden in the district court, and 
has failed to meet that burden before this Court.   
 Even if this Court concludes Starr has met her burden of showing error in 
the admission of Exhibits 1C and 1D, the district court correctly concluded, in the 
alternative, that any error was harmless.  (R., pp.201-202.)  In finding any error 
harmless, the district court cited I.C.R. 52 and the “harmless error test 
established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),” and stated: 
This Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the claimed 
erroneously admitted statements did not contribute to the verdict.  
Starr actually possessed both the pipe and the marijuana.  She 
admitted smoking it.  She clearly had knowledge of the items 
because she retrieved them from her room. Whether she 
purchased the marijuana or had it given to her, how much she paid 
for it, and how often she used it are largely irrelevant to the charges 
she faced.  Though corroborative, this evidence was not essential 
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to the prosecution.  The evidence was overwhelming.  Any error in 
admitting these statements was harmless.    
 
(R., pp.201-202.)  The district court was correct.   
 Pursuant to I.C.R. 52, “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  “The inquiry is whether, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] 
even without the admission of the challenged evidence.”  State v. Johnson, 148 
Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).   
 Starr’s unchallenged admissions were made early and often in her 
encounter with Officer Hammer.  (Tr., p.116, L.22 – p.117, L.22, p.119, Ls.1-17, 
p.121, Ls.7-9, p.122, Ls.20-21, p.123, L.23 – p.124, L.1.)  Those admissions 
included Starr stating, “I have a pipe, and I have, like two or three bowls of pot 
left” (Tr., p.15, Ls.19-20; Exhibit 1A at 2:40 – 2:45; see also Tr. p.121, L.8, p.123, 
L.23 – p.124, L.1), and telling Officer Hammer they had smoked “one pipe, two 
bowls between all of [them]” (Exhibit 1A at 7:25 – 7:30; Tr., p.122, Ls.20-21).  In 
addition, Starr testified in her defense, but never denied possessing either the 
marijuana or the paraphernalia.  (See generally Tr., pp.170-175.)  Instead, Starr 
implicitly admitted culpability, testifying that Young told Officer Hammer they had 
“been smoking” (Tr., p.173, Ls.17-19), and when asked if there was “anything 
else” she wanted to “share” with the jury, she testified: 
. . . [T]his whole experience has taught me a lot.  It’s not a situation 
I ever want to be in ever again.  I realize I put not only my well 
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being at risk but my children too, and it’s been -- I regret every 
minute of it.  I can’t explain how deeply I regret it. 
 
(Tr., p.174, L.24 – p.175, L.5).   
 The incriminating statements Starr made in Exhibits 1C and 1D were no 
different for purposes of establishing guilt than Starr’s other admissions.  On 
Exhibit 1C, Starr tells Officer Hammer the marijuana belongs to her; this was the 
same unchallenged admission Starr made from the beginning.  On Exhibit 1D, 
Starr tells Officer Hammer she bought the marijuana “from somebody,” indicated 
how much she paid for it, and stated she did not smoke marijuana “very often.”  
While these comments provided details on how Starr obtained the marijuana and 
her frequency of use, they were not, as the district court explained, “essential to 
the prosecution” in light of Starr’s other admissions, including her trial testimony.  
There can be no doubt that a rational jury would have convicted Starr even 
without the admission of Exhibits 1C or 1D.    
 On appeal, Starr argues the district court applied the incorrect “standard 
for harmless error review” because, she contends, she was not required to show 
“the evidence was essential to the conviction, but rather,” it was the state’s 
burden to show the evidence did not contribute to the verdict.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.10.)  According to Starr, “the State did not even attempt to meet this burden, 
even after the District Court raised the issue at oral argument on appeal.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  There are several flaws in Starr’s argument.   
 First, there is no evidence in the record to support Starr’s assertion that 
the state “did not even attempt to meet” its burden of showing harmless error 
“even after the District Court raised the issue at oral argument” because the 
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record on appeal to this Court does not include a transcript of the oral argument 
in district court.  It is axiomatic that the appellant bears the burden of providing a 
sufficient record on appeal to substantiate his or her appellate claims.  State v. 
Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449, 680 P.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 1984).  “In the absence 
of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, [the appellate 
court] will not presume error.”  State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38, 43 P.3d 
794, 797 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Beason, 119 Idaho at 105, 803 P.2d at 1011).  
To the contrary, any missing portions of the record are presumed to support the 
actions of the court below.  State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 
1352 (Ct. App. 1992).  Starr’s unsupported claim regarding oral argument to the 
district court fails.     
 Second, even if the state did not present any argument on harmless error, 
the district court decided the error was harmless, and this Court may review a 
decision actually made by the district court.  See  State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 
553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) (issues “argued to or decided by the trial court” 
may be considered on appeal). 
 Third, the district court did not apply an incorrect harmless error standard.  
Once again, Starr’s contrary argument reflects either a misunderstanding or a 
misrepresentation of the district court’s opinion.  The district court clearly cited 
the correct legal standard and properly applied it, and nothing in the language 
used by the district court can reasonably be construed as imposing upon Starr 
the burden of showing anything, much less the burden of showing the challenged 
 18 
“evidence was essential to the conviction.”  Starr’s argument otherwise is without 
merit.        
 Application of the correct legal standards to the facts shows that Starr has 
failed to meet her burden of showing the district court erred either in affirming the 
magistrate’s decision to admit Exhibits 1C and 1D or in concluding any error in 
the admission of the exhibits was harmless.     
 
D. Starr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The 
Magistrate’s Denial Of Her Request To Admit Suppressed Evidence 
 
At Starr’s request, the magistrate suppressed the evidence “found after 
the initial items that were brought to the kitchen table.”  (Tr., p.64, L.23 – p.65, 
L.1; see also p.65, Ls.14-16.)  It appears from the record that the suppressed 
items included another pipe, a bong, and a box with “ash and stems.”  (Tr., p.30, 
L.20 – p.31, L.20, p.40, L.21 – p.41, L.3.)  Following the magistrate’s 
suppression decision, the state redacted the majority of the audio recording of 
Officer Hammer’s interaction with Starr from the point Officer Hammer asked to 
search Starr’s room until the end of the recording.  (See Tr., p.160, L.17 – p.161, 
L.2; Exhibits 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D.)  After the state rested, however, Starr moved to 
introduce the entirety of the audio.  (Tr., p.160, Ls.6-10.)  Starr asserted she was 
making the request “[i]n light of the way the case ha[d] proceeded,” and “[t]o try 
and give a full understanding to the jury.”  (Tr., p.160, Ls.6-14.)  Starr also 
agreed that she wanted to introduce the entirety of the audio in order to 
“persuade the jury that her admissions were not reliable and that they were 
made under . . . some kind of pressure, which render[ed] them unreliable.”  (Tr., 
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p.159, L.20 – p.160, L.6.)  In other words, Starr sought to vacate the suppression 
decision she pursued so that she could argue to the jury that half of the state’s 
evidence should be disregarded.  The magistrate correctly rejected Starr’s 
request and the district court correctly affirmed that decision.   
A court’s determination that evidence is not admissible is generally not 
party-specific; it is equally inadmissible for both sides.  While a party who seeks 
exclusion of evidence may later waive its original objection either by presenting 
the evidence itself, or by “opening the door” to the presentation of such 
evidence, the ability to do so is not automatic and nothing in the law prevents the 
opposing party from objecting to such tactics.  See State v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17, 
19, 794 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1990) (if defendant opens door regarding 
evidence of good character, state may rebut with contrary evidence).  For 
example, if the state prepares its case and presents evidence in reliance on an 
evidentiary ruling solicited by the defendant, there is no reason the state cannot 
seek to enforce that ruling against the defendant.  That is what happened in this 
case, and, as found by the district court (R., p.203), the magistrate properly 
exercised its discretion in balancing the equities and allowing Starr to ask Officer 
Hammer questions about the circumstances surrounding her admissions, but not 
allowing her to introduce the entirety of the audio (Tr., p.162, L.22 – p.163, L.12).   
On appeal, Starr contends the ruling was erroneous because, she argues, 
the magistrate’s concern for being “fair to both sides” is “inconsistent with I.R.E. 
403’s prerequisite that probative value be substantially outweighed [sic] before 
exclusion is proper.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.13 (footnote omitted).)  Starr’s 
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argument ignores the entirety of the magistrate’s discussion of the prejudice to 
the state.  The magistrate explained: 
The bigger issue is whether it gives the jury the impression 
that somehow it was the State that was trying to limit the 
information that they obtained and that the defense is now 
heroically giving them the whole story, when, in fact, it’s exactly the 
opposite of what occurred. 
 
I think that’s very unfair to the State, that possibility.  I don’t 
know whether the jury would look at it that way or not, but that 
possibility is very unfair to the State. 
 
(Tr., p.162, Ls.10-18.)   
The magistrate’s “fair to both sides” comment was made in relation to its 
decision to allow Starr to recall Officer Hammer and ask him questions “that 
relate to the issue of how much pressure he put on Ms. Starr prior to making 
these admissions and what the nature of the encounter was between them.”  
(Tr., p.162, L.22 – p.163, L.3.)  Nothing about the magistrate’s analysis of the 
prejudice, or its concern about being “fair to both sides” constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.   
Starr also contends that the exclusion of the entirety of the audio was 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 
368 (1964), that “the state bears the burden of establishing the voluntariness of a 
confession prior to its admission.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  This holding is 
irrelevant to this case because Starr never moved to suppress any of her 
admissions based on lack of voluntariness prior to their admission.  (See R., 
p.202 (district court noting lack of any assertion that Starr’s statements were not 
voluntary).)  To the extent Starr sought to have the jury decide the voluntariness 
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of her admissions after they were already admitted, this is precisely what the 
Supreme Court in Jackson found problematic.    
At issue in Jackson was a state court practice that allowed the jury to 
determine the voluntariness of a confession where voluntariness was at issue.  
378 U.S. at 375.  The jury was instructed “that if it found the confession 
involuntary, it was to disregard it entirely, and determine guilt or innocence solely 
from the other evidence in the case.”  Id. at 374-375.  On the other hand, if the 
jury “found the confession voluntary, it was to determine its truth or reliability and 
afford it weight accordingly.”  Id. at 375.  The Supreme Court found this practice 
“did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the confession 
offered in evidence at the trial,” and did not protect a defendant’s “right to be free 
of a conviction based upon a coerced confession.”  Id. at 377.  Because “the use 
of involuntary confessions” is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
instructed “[i]t is both practical and desirable” that “a proper determination of 
voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession to the jury which 
is adjudicating guilt or innocence.”  Id. at 386, 395.  A correct reading of Jackson 
shows that it is actually contrary to any claim that Starr was entitled to submit 
evidence to the jury in an effort to persuade them that her admissions were 
involuntary. 
To the extent Starr sought to introduce evidence and argue that her 
statements were unreliable (as opposed to involuntary), the magistrate’s ruling 
allowed her to do so because Starr was expressly permitted to ask Officer 
Hammer questions “that relate[d] to the issue of how much pressure he put on 
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[her] prior to her making the[ ] admissions and what the nature of the encounter 
was between them.”  (Tr. p.162, L.24 – p.163, L.3.)  In addition, nothing 
precluded Starr from testifying to the same.  That the magistrate did not allow 
her to supplement her questioning with the portions of the audio that were 
previously excluded is insufficient to show evidentiary error.   
Even if this Court concludes that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate’s exclusion of the entirety of the audio, any error is harmless.  Error 
can be deemed harmless if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.  State v. 
Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ---, 342 P.3d 628, 630 (2015) (citation omitted).  There 
was overwhelming evidence of Starr’s guilt, which would have been unchanged 
by the admission of the entirety of the audio.  Indeed, admission of the entire 
audio would have only corroborated the evidence of guilt that was admitted in the 
audio’s absence.  Moreover, nothing about the entire audio, or Starr’s own trial 
testimony, demonstrates that her admissions were unreliable, particularly the 
admissions she made from the outset before Officer Hammer even asked to 
search her bedroom.  Any error in the exclusion of the entire audio was, 
therefore, harmless.        
Because Starr has failed to show any error in the district court’s decision 
affirming the magistrate’s suppression and evidentiary rulings, she is not entitled 






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
against Starr and the district court’s Memorandum Opinion on Appeal.   
 DATED this 9th day of September, 2016. 
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